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The DeSyRe project builds on-demand adaptive and reliable Systems-on-Chips (SoCs). As fabrication technology 
scales down, chips are becoming less reliable, thereby incurring increased power and performance costs for fault 
tolerance. To make matters worse, power density is becoming a significant limiting factor in SoC design, in general. In the 
face of such changes in the technological landscape, current solutions for fault tolerance are expected to introduce 
excessive overheads in future systems. Moreover, attempting to design and manufacture a totally defect-/fault-free system, 
would impact heavily, even prohibitively, the design, manufacturing, and testing costs, as well as the system performance 
and power consumption. In this context, DeSyRe delivers a new generation of systems that are reliable by design at well-
balanced power, performance, and design costs. In our attempt to reduce the overheads of fault-tolerance, only a small 
fraction of the chip is built to be fault-free. This fault-free part is then employed to manage the remaining fault-prone 
resources of the SoC. The DeSyRe framework is applied to two medical systems with high safety requirements (measured 
using the IEC 61508 functional safety standard) and tight power and performance constraints. 
 
Keywords— Fault-Tolerance, System-on-Chip, Reconfigurable Hardware, Medical Systems. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the coming nanoscale era, chips are becoming less reliable, while manufacturing fault-free chips is becoming 
increasingly more difficult and costly [1][3]. Prominent causes for this are the shrinking device features, the sheer 
number of components on a given area of silicon, as well as the increasing complexity of current and future chips. It 
is expected that a significant number of devices will be defective already at manufacture time and many more will 
degrade and fail within their expected lifetime [2] . Furthermore, process variations as well as the increasing number 
of soft errors introduce additional sources of errors for future chips.  
The ITRS targets a constant defect rate (1395 defects/m2) in order to keep the chip yield constant [6]. Such a 
target is expected to substantially increase the chip manufacturing cost of future semiconductor technologies. 
Alternatively, chips need to be designed to tolerate an increasing number of defects in order to maintain a high yield. 
Apart from defects at manufacture time, aging effects are becoming more severe leading to more permanent and 
intermittent faults during the lifetime of a chip. Transistors degrade faster; while the degradation rate is further 
accelerated by the heavy testing processes (e.g. burn-in). Aging is expected to shorten SoC lifetime and to be a 
significant source of errors in technologies beyond 16-nm [1] . Process variations cause devices to operate differently 
than expected; such variations are random dopant fluctuations, heat flux, as well as lithography problems due to the 
shrinking geometries. Currently, on-chip clock frequency and total power consumption present variations up to 30% 
and 50%, respectively, across different parts of a single chip; it is projected that variations will only become more 
severe in the future and worst-case, deterministic design will be insufficient and unable to deliver reliable systems. 
Finally, as transistor count increases, the number of soft errors on a chip (i.e. transient faults) grows exponentially 
[2]. For example, by the 16-nm generation, the failure rate will be almost 100-fold higher that at 180-nm [2] ; current 
fault-tolerance techniques such as simple check-pointing will, then, incur prohibitively high energy and performance 
costs. 
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Figure 1:  Dynamic, Static and total power consumption of a Microprocessor chip vs. the maximum available power 
budget, based on the ITRS 2008 and 2009 projections. 
 
As feature size continues to shrink and chips become less reliable, the cost for delivering reliable chips is 
expected to grow for future technology nodes. The price in system power and energy consumption, in performance 
degradation, and in extra resources, is getting higher in order to perform redundant computations in time or in space. 
However, it is a well-known fact that power consumption is becoming a severe problem, while performance no 
longer scales very well (mostly due to power-density limitations). To reduce some of the above costs, DeSyRe aims 
at reliable systems containing and tolerating unreliable components rather than targeting totally fault-free systems. 
Our goal is to describe a new, more efficient design framework for SoCs, which provides reliability at lower power 
and performance cost.  
Although the above technology trends make the design of future SoCs harder, one of them can be turned to our 
advantage. As shown in Figure 1, the increasing power density limits the gate density. In a few years, significant parts 
of a chip will be forced to remain powered-down in order to keep within the available power budget [15]. In DeSyRe, 
we capitalize on this observation and propose to exploit the aforementioned unused resources to offer flexibility and 
reconfigurability on a chip. Until now, reconfigurable hardware had a significant resource overhead; however, as 
explained above, this limitation no longer exists as on-chip resources are becoming “cheaper”. A dynamically 
reconfigurable hardware-substrate can provide an excellent solution for defect tolerance; it can be used to adapt to 
faults on demand, isolate and correct defects, as well as to provide spare resources to substitute defective blocks.  In 
the DeSyRe project, we intend to use such a reconfigurable substrate and combine it with system-level techniques to 
provide adaptive and on-demand reliable systems.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Sections II and III, we describe the DeSyRe design framework 
and system architecture, respectively. Sections IV and V summarize the DeSyRe fault-tolerance techniques and 
reconfigurable substrate. In Sections VI and VII, we present the medical applications and the baseline SoCs used in 
DeSyRe. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section VIII. 
II. THE DESYRE DESIGN FRAMEWORK 
Systems-on-Chip comprise multiple design levels, ranging from top-level running software to hardware 
components and all the way down to the elementary technological (transistor) substrate. Although increasing design 
complexity has so far been kept in check by partitioning the design in horizontal levels (e.g. software, hardware, 
technology), this approach is rapidly becoming inefficient due to the increasing degree of cross-level sophistication 
required for modern embedded-system design. Knowledge of levels both above and below a specific level is 
becoming imperative for building functional systems. This implies a vertical, cross-cutting, level partitioning with 
designers having knowledge of what transpires above and below their respective levels of expertise. 
To address this pragmatic need, the DeSyRe framework is partitioned across two orthogonal design 
dimensions: a physical and a logical abstraction. The physical partitioning is based on the different technological 
substrates (with different fault densities) used in the various parts of the framework and is mostly of interest to 
experts closer to the technology level. The logical partitioning considers the same framework from the viewpoint of 
functionality (i.e. which part of the system does what) and should mostly interest experts closer to the architecture 
and system level.  
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Figure 2: DeSyRe SoC physical partitioning with a fault-free section for SoC management and a fault-prone section for 
SoC functionality. 
A. Physical Partitioning 
Figure 2 illustrates the physical partitioning of the DeSyRe SoC. The design area is physically divided into a 
fault-free (FF) section providing overall system management and a fault-prone (FP) section providing the actual 
system functionality. The motivation for this partitioning is reducing the chip cost: Designing a totally fault-free 
system is expensive, thus the FF section should be small and lightweight. 
 
Fault-Free section: The FF section is required to provide centralized, system-wide control of the SoC, aiming 
to provide Quality of Service (QoS) attributes such as performance, low power consumption, resource utilization and 
fault tolerance. The various techniques through which this will be achieved involve an efficient combination of: 
• Online fault tolerance. 
• Runtime task scheduling, while being aware of task characteristics such as urgency and safety-criticality. 
• Resource allocation, under varying availability of computational resources. 
• Reconfiguration schemes to achieve flexible and defect-tolerant operation. 
Fault-Prone section: The FP section is under the direct control of the FF section. It contains various 
components realized in the DeSyRe reconfigurable substrate. The components implement the main system 
functionality based on the target application (domain). They are required to exhibit, among others, self-checking and 
self-correcting properties, working in tight synergy with those of the FF section. To this end, the various components 
should be equipped with their own self-checking and -correcting mechanisms, albeit under (in)direct control of the 
FF section. 
B. Logical Partitioning 
The logical partitioning organizes the DeSyRe SoC in three main layers. Figure 3 depicts the layers from bottom 
to top: components, middleware and runtime system. This subdivision is based on the abstraction level involved and 
the tasks handled by each layer.  
Components: The bottom layer deals with fault-tolerance issues of each component (i.e. unit which delivers a 
specific functionality) in the FP section, individually. In other words, it is responsible for providing component-level 
(intrinsic) fault tolerance. The system is composed of multiple heterogeneous components located at the fault-prone 
section. The design of these components takes into account the requirements of the DeSyRe system. The components 
are able to autonomously detect faults that might appear in them and possibly correct a subset of these detected faults 
(in other words, they exhibit self-checking and self-correcting properties). To deal with the aforementioned faults, 
each component further has a certain degree of flexibility, by being able to support task migration –that is, to receive 
a new task or transfer a running task elsewhere. Those features, of course, require interfacing with the above logical 
layers, to be able to send status information and receive commands concerning possible modifications. 
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Figure 3: Logical partitioning of a DeSyRe SoC: Components layer (SoC functionality), Middleware layer and Runtime-
System layer (SoC management). 
 
For the list of faults with which a component deals intrinsically, any detection and/or correction action from the 
component side has to be transparent to the upper layers. In case there is partial recovery - affecting functionality and 
QoS constraints - or no correction whatsoever, the upper layers have to be notified about the new status of the 
component. Component-level fault tolerance, as opposed to centralized techniques, provides recovery schemes with 
the advantage of lower latency. On the other hand, these schemes are, as a matter of fact, less efficient than the ones 
supported by the upper logical layers. 
Middleware: The second layer is responsible for the hardware synthesis and reconfiguration of the components 
in order to provide correctly functioning underlying hardware to the upper layer. In this layer we develop 
mechanisms for the dynamic reconfiguration of hardware resources implemented in the (fine- and/or coarse-grain) 
reconfigurable FP section. The Middleware manages the components as black boxes which need to be 
interconnected, isolated, (re)placed in order to deliver a functioning hardware platform ready to be used for running 
the tasks that the runtime system dictates. To one extent, the Middleware makes all its actions transparent to the 
Runtime system in order to provide well-functioning hardware; that is in order to ensure the reconfiguration process 
is performed correctly and installs a correct new configuration.  
Runtime System: The third layer deals with run-time issues of the system; its basic functionality is to schedule 
tasks to components, to ensure the best quality of service for the soft real-time portion of the applications, and to 
adapt the system in the presence of faults. To deal with faults, the Runtime System collects system health status 
information for all system components to establish a system health map. Using the health map together with a 
description of the application tasks and their requirements, the Runtime System identifies a global assignment of 
tasks to the various system resources that satisfies the application requirements and achieves the best possible 
performance from the (possibly faulty) processing cores in the fault prone area. The Runtime System functionality is 
realized in the FF section of the SoC (running on a GPP). The main challenge for the runtime system is to be 
adaptive so to conform to the underlying reconfigurable hardware and to use it efficiently. 
In addition to the above logical layers, DeSyRe is involved with three distributed tasks that span across the 
three logical layers, since all three of them need to deal with and support them: 
• Online Testing: Dynamically scheduled tests for fault detection and diagnosis, in order to constantly update 
the components’ status. 
• Graceful Degradation: Loss of performance and/or functionality is preferred to a system crash. 
• Virtualization: Tasks will be able to be executed on different, heterogeneous components as a solution to 
component unavailability due to faults. 
 
These distributed tasks will be further addressed in Section IV. 
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Figure 4: DeSyRe System Architecture, illustrating the primary Hardware and Software modules. 
III. DESYRE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The DeSyRe system architecture is designed to fit the physical partitioning and logical layers described in the 
previous section. Figure 4 illustrates the Software and Hardware modules that constitute the DeSyRe SoC. The 
software modules are running on a processing unit located in the fault free part, and implement the runtime system 
optimizations, the middleware functionality for reconfiguration, as well as centralized software implemented fault-
tolerance mechanisms. At the fault-prone part, each component has a wrapper to interface with the fault-free part of 
the system and to locally support functionalities pertinent to reconfigurability and fault-tolerance. 
The main hardware components of the system are instances of a simple, MIPS-like, 5-stage RISC processor 
(SiMS), of a fixed-point high performance DSP processor (Xentium), and some custom application specific 
components. Each of these cores is equipped with local checkers, detecting and reporting faults, and some degree of 
reconfigurability. The interconnection mechanism is a Network on Chip utilizing a 32-bit bidirectional datapath and 
XY-routing. Each component is provided with a wrapper, which locally supports critical tasks by the following 
means: Component reconfiguration is controlled from the wrapper; test vector generation and response analysis for 
online testing can be performed locally; a watchdog is used to detect unresponsive components; the state of 
components can be observed and controlled to facilitate both check-pointing and online testing; finally, faults 
detected in the local checkers are recorded and reported to the upper system layers. 
The system hardware as it is described above, is being managed by software running on the fault-free part of 
the system. A Runtime system constantly assesses the status of the hardware components and makes decisions on the 
overall system configuration: The system is dynamically optimized based on the availability of components, the 
presence of defects, the workload and possibly other constraints. Graceful degradation is employed whenever new 
permanent effects are discovered to be taking place. The decisions taken can involve remapping of the tasks to the 
available components or even modification of the set of components through hardware reconfiguration. In the latter 
case, a Middleware module is used, that will reconfigure hardware as requested, having knowledge of the 
reconfigurable resources available at the time. 
The overall system status, which is the raw input with which the Runtime works, is monitored by the Software 
Fault Tolerance layer. This part of the system employs software routines for the following functions: Saving check-
points and using them whenever transient faults dictate rollback of system operation; analyzing and classifying the 
faults detected in hardware as transient, intermittent or permanent; deciding on the need of and managing the 
execution of online testing to help with the aforementioned fault classification; accumulating the signals from the 
different components’ watchdogs and using them to keep track of (un)responsive resources. A defect map is also 
kept by the Software Fault Tolerance layer, to record all relevant information about defect-free and defective 
hardware parts. 
In the remainder of this section we discuss specific system-level parameters and consideration in DeSyRe. 
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A. Execution and programming model:  
The envisioned DeSyRe systems consist of multiple and potentially heterogeneous Processing Elements (PEs). 
Mapping DeSyRe applications to such a substrate, requires that computations are partitioned and assigned for 
execution to these processing blocks. In addition to the basic code execution, we need to address the application and 
system reliability requirements. At the software level, one important functionality necessary to deal with potential 
execution errors (stemming from hardware faults) is task re-execution. To be able to re-execute correctly the tasks, 
we need to be able to save and restore their processing state. After investigating alternatives, we concluded that an 
efficient way to address these requirements is to adopt a Task-Based execution model, in order to simplify the system 
design without loss of generality. This decision affects the overall design in two ways: (a) the programming model 
specifies how the application developers should write their code to be used in the DeSyRe platforms, and (b) it sets 
the requirements for the DeSyRe Runtime System (RS). 
Task-based programming models require that the programmer defines –via explicit language constructs of code 
annotation– portions of code that will be wrapped as a “task”, which will be the unit of scheduling work for 
execution. In addition, to allow the exploitation of parallelism, task inputs, outputs and in-outs (variables that are 
read and written by the same task) are declared as such in the source code. Doing so enables the compiler to 
statically analyze dependencies and determine the possibility of parallel execution of tasks.  The same information 
can be also used dynamically when the static analysis is insufficient to determine the dynamic independence of tasks.  
Several task-based approaches have been investigated and shown to be efficient in high-performance 
computing environments e.g. [17]. We use a similar approach to the OMPSs [17], but more restricted in the sense 
that not all the OMPSs features are adopted in our programming model. In DeSyRe, the programmer will have to 
follow the task-based programming model, i.e. divide the application into different tasks, and annotate them with the 
task definition directives, so that the task’s inputs, outputs, and in-outs are identified. With the code annotation of all 
application tasks, the Runtime System can efficiently identify any data dependencies, and schedule tasks in correct 
sequence without the need for synchronization. In addition, the Runtime System can also take into account other 
constraints i.e. energy consumption, real-time constraints, etc. In the DeSyRe context, dependency checking will be 
done dynamically to match the dynamic nature of the system that changes due to faults. Thus adopting a task-based 
execution model has the following consequences: 
• Inter-task communication can happen only at the task boundaries 
• Checkpoints need only be saved at the task-boundaries, and as a consequence, domino effects during rollback 
are avoided 
• Architectural processor (component) state needs not to be stored or transferred to another processor during 
migration, since migrating the task description and its inputs is sufficient to re-execute. In this way, task re-
in case of faults is simplified. 
DeSyRe adopts a Partitioned Global Address Space (PGAS) [1], where the fault-free processor and all PEs can have 
access to any address. Specific memory regions are (physically) local to PEs, and can be used efficiently for their 
tasks execution. Moreover, part of the global memory address space will be used as a global system storage (GSS) 
region. The latter keeps common software data structures of the Runtime System such as task dependency and 
application variable tables, which are accessible by all PEs and the fault-free processor, in order to control task 
scheduling and execution.  
B. System state management:  
Storing reliably the system state is a major issue under the presence of hardware faults and SEUs. Migration 
and checkpointing of tasks require maintaining the state reliably upon spawning tasks, updating the state upon 
completion, and migrating the state to a subsequent task. While conventional memory array error 
detection/correction techniques incur high latency and energy overhead in the presence of high fault rates, there is a 
number of emerging techniques that enable detection and correction at much lower power. We are investigating the 
performance, energy and reliability tradeoffs of a number of techniques to overcome memory vulnerability for 
checkpointing/migrating task state at each PE of the DeSyRe SoC. We are considering a diverse set of fabrication 
technology nodes to determine the performance, energy, and area overhead for a task with a given execution time 
(and rate of memory updates), while varying the fault rate. We are also studying idempotency analysis as a way to 
reduce updated state during task execution time. In particular we have considered decoupled codes ([18][19]) to 
protect memory arrays in one node vs. parity-protected redundant memory arrays placed on different two distinct 
nodes across the NoC.  
Our initial results indicate that energy-efficient, decoupled codes offer a superior performance, energy and area 
trade off over maintaining duplicate copies across the NoC for near-term and medium-term technology nodes. 
However, duplicate copies across the NoC have the added benefit of protecting against NoC failure and disconnected 
nodes. According to these initial results, we consider a fault-free substrate that can send the task state to a compute 
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node on the fault-prone substrate upon task spawn, as shown in Figure 5. This state is the (architecturally-
visible) input and output to the task. The state can be directly communicated across subsequent task spawns among 
the compute nodes and need not be maintained on the fault-free substrate. This practically confirms the suitability of 
the task-based programming model chosen for the DeSyRe architecture. 
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Figure 5 : State management in a DeSyRe system. 
 
   
Figure 6 – Task-re-execution in the presense of faults: The matrix tree-multiplications micro-benchmark execution time 
and speedup (left), and energy consumption (right) against the baseline system. 
 
1) Task re-execution 
The aforementioned task-based execution model and system state-management and checkpointing approach, 
have been implemented in evaluated in a Microblaze-based MPSoC mapped to a Virtex6-based ML605 development 
board. The MPSoC consists of a master Microblaze (MMB) to host the runtime system, and 7 workers (WMBs) for 
tasks execution. We implemented a micro-benchmark that performs a reduction tree of matrix multiplications. 
Starting with 24 matrices, we performed a set of 12 concurrent matrix multiplications. As soon as they are done, a 
reduction phase begins with each pair being multiplied to produce a new matrix, and after 5 such steps, a single 
output matrix is calculated. The total number of multiplications is 24, requiring in total 6 steps due to the limited 
number of worker cores, and therefore the maximum theoretical speedup is 24/6 = 4x.  
On the left portion of Figure 6 we plot the execution times of the cascaded matrix multiplications micro-benchmark 
execution times on a single-processor (without runtime support) baseline system, 1-worker, and 7-worker MPSoCs. 
In addition, we consider three fault error rates 4%, 20% and 41% of the tasks being faulty. Moreover, in the second 
case, we assume that WMB4 becomes permanently damaged after 5 task executions; hence the runtime detects it and 
immediately migrates its remaining tasks to other active workers. With a 5x5 matrices size, the 7-worker MPSoC 
performance is low compared to the baseline due to the tasks scheduling overhead. However, it outperforms the 
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baseline one when the array sizes become 15x15 or larger and scales to almost 3.95x compared to the baseline when 
the matrix sizes become 35x35.  
We also measured the energy consumption for the same runs. According to the Xilinx XPower utility, the 
baseline and 7-worker systems require approximately 4.1W and 4.45W of applied power. Figure 6 (right part) shows 
the MPSoC energy consumption for all considered cases. Compared to the baseline and for matrices size is 5x5, the 
task scheduling overhead increases the overall execution time, hence also the consumed energy, which is 16x higher. 
The same applies also for all fault rates considered, due to the transient and permanent faults occurrence. However, 
when the task workload increases, the overall execution time is significantly reduced compared to the baseline one, 
hence consumption becomes eventually as low as 27% of the baseline energy when there are no faults. Finally, under 
the largest task workload (35x35 matrix size) energy consumption still remains less than the baseline one for both 
4% and 20% fault rates, while under a 41% error rate energy consumption is 15% higher compared to the baseline 
one. 
C. Virtualization, context switching and task migration support:  
The selected task-based execution model and state management functionality simplifies the task of context 
switching, task migration and as a consequence virtualization support of a DeSyRe system. The granularity of atomic 
operation in DeSyRe is established at the task input/output boundaries and there is no need to save the internal state 
of the component that runs the task. As with the state management, DeSyRe tasks will execute until completion 
before the context switching, task re-execution, or task migration will be performed. Under this scenario, only the 
input (and in some cases the output) data of a task need to be saved and when required restored. While task migration 
between homogeneous processing elements is fairly straightforward, the DeSyRe Runtime System will also support 
migration to different types of processing elements. To support task migration in heterogeneous resources, the 
DeSyRe Runtime System has to be provided with the corresponding task versions (native binaries) for multiple types 
of resourses available in the system. In addition, we assume that all heterogeneous components support all the 
necessary native data types so there is no need for data conversions. Also, as the state of tasks is saved only on task 
boundaries, and at the level of the input variables, differences in the internal state of the various components (i.e. # of 
registers, and architectural state in general) do not affect task migration. The selected approach toward context 
switching and virtualization will obviously increase the pressure on the memory footprint of the application, and may 
be challenging in case of embedded, real-time systems. On the other hand, removing the need of saving the 
heterogeneous internal states of the components will remove completely the additional traffic, reduce the system 
complexity and provide a glueless support for task migration across components with different architectures. The 
advantages of the latter and the requirements of the DeSyRe applications validated our choices. 
D. Graceful degradation   
As already mentioned, the DeSyRe System on Chip is designed to be capable of managing the accumulation of 
faults in the system in a graceful manner – in other words to refrain from crashing and instead decide to sacrifice part  
of the system functionality and/or performance. In DeSyRe, Graceful Degradation can be achieved in three different 
ways: 
 
• Hardware Reconfiguration: The Runtime can exploit the coarse- and fine-grain reconfigurability capabilities of 
the components, in order to tailor the set of working components to the application needs. Focusing on the 
coarse-grain, partially defective components will be used for tasks that they are still able to perform, while the 
fine-grain reconfigurable substrate will be utilized to deal with shortages of specific functional units (see also 
Section VI, Figure 13). 
• Workload Adaptation: The Runtime has the authority to adapt the workload of the system by dropping (low-
priority) tasks or replacing tasks with other that have different processing requirements (possibly less 
computationally intensive and less efficient/accurate). One approach to this is to switch between different 
predefined modes of the application (i.e., normal mode, no extra features mode, emergency mode). 
• Task (re-)mapping: Given the dynamic nature of both the available system resources and the software 
workload, the binding of tasks to resources will also have to be modified regularly. This can be also utilized to 
facilitate Graceful Degradation: If the number of available cores is reduced, the Runtime can either queue more 
tasks on the remaining cores and expect them to be carried out slower (performance degradation) or drop the 
least important tasks so that the rest are performed without performance loss (functional degradation). 
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Figure 7: DeSyRe online testing support in component 
wrapper. 
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E. Online Testing 
 Permanent faults, due to design, manufacturing or aging effects, will be detected in DeSyRe through online 
testing, scheduled centrally by the runtime system manager (see Figure 7). To facilitate such testing, DeSyRe 
components will be designed with testing support architectures suitable for that particular component. These support 
architectures will include interfaces between runtime system manager and the local online testing support alongside 
the actual testing mechanism. In the following, online testing support architectures for Xentium DSP component, 
which is a crucial component in DeSyRe framework, is discussed in greater detail. 
To facilitate online testing, Xentium incorporates wrapper design with online testing support. The testing 
support architecture contains interface with the runtime system manager via context switching mechanism (see Figure 
4). Since online testing will require exclusive access to Xentium’s datapath and memory, the runtime system 
manager will enable context switching through local check-pointing at the component level. Moreover, the testing 
support architecture within the Xentium wrapper will contain test vector storage or generation mechanisms for 
software implemented built-in self test (SW BIST) and test vector analyzers accessed through the test access 
mechanism (TAM) as shown in Figure 7. As can be seen, the online testing support architecture, which includes the 
test access mechanism and test vector storage/generation mechanism, is designed around the original Xentium DSP 
component. 
Figure 8 shows the detailed testing support architecture for Xentium DSP. The testing support architecture 
includes hardware/software based co-testing mechanism, co-ordinated by a central test access mechanism (TAM). 
The processor datapath is tested through a number of different test input vectors interfaced through the TAM. The 
responses from the processor datapath is then analyzed by the test output analyzer for detecting permanent faults. To 
test the memory devices built-in self-test (BIST) controller is incorporated. The BIST controller generates a number 
of memory access instructions in random locations and feeds these instructions through the TAM. The output of 
these instructions is then analyzed to detect the presence of one or more permanent faults. Using such BIST 
controller reduces the number of test vectors needed to be stored for effective fault detection coverage for such 
devices. The test vectors storage and the BIST controllers (Figure 8) are designed with self-testing capability to 
ensure fault-free testing mechanism. More detailed description of the Xentium online testing mechanism is described 
in [27].  
Apart from Xentium DSP a number of different other components are also being designed with appropriate 
testing support architectures. For example, error detection and correction coding is being incorporated in the 
network-on-chip (NoC) components with dynamic testing scheduling, RISC (SiMS) processors are being designed 
with instruction retry architecture [20], coarse- and fine-grained reconfigurable logics are being designed with 
appropriate redundancy logics etc. To achieve the best possible permanent fault detection coverage, trade-off 
between the coverage and complexity of testing is currently being extensively studied.  
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IV. DESYRE MECHANISMS FOR FAULT TOLERANCE 
The proposed framework is expected to cope with permanent, transient and intermittent faults using the above 
described logical layers and physical parts. Table 1 summarizes the DeSyRe mechanisms to detect and correct 
various fault types.  
Permanent faults (defects), due to design, manufacturing or aging effects, are detected and diagnosed in 
DeSyRe through online testing scheduled centrally by the runtime system or distributed by self-checking 
mechanisms at each component. Hardware reconfiguration of the defective part is the first choice for correction; this 
involves isolation, and replacement of the defective part, performed by Middleware with possible high-level 
decisions made at the runtime system layer. When reconfiguration is not possible the tasks scheduled in the defective 
parts of the system are re-scheduled in other available components. To economize system resources, component 
sharing may be possible at the cost of performance degradation. The above will be achieved based on the graceful 
degradation policies of the system. 
Transient faults (soft-errors) are detected in DeSyRe either centrally at the software-level using error detection 
(and correction) codes or locally at the components using checkers. Check-pointing mechanisms will be used to 
rollback to a known good state and recover from faults. Check-pointing will be adaptive to the application 
requirements and the fault density (i.e. adaptive frequency and placement of checkpoints) for energy efficiency. At 
the component level self-correcting mechanisms may be able to correct a sub-set of faults. 
 
Table 1: DeSyRe Techniques for Tolerating various types of faults 
 
 
In DeSyRe, intermittent faults (i.e. periodic transient faults) are distinguished from transient faults in order to 
treat these differently. To do so, we add to the transient-fault detection mechanisms extra functionality to determine 
whether a fault is repeated. Then, task migration to other available components or hardware reconfigurations can be 
used for correction, while adaptive check-pointing and context switching mechanisms will be required to rollback 
and recover or to migrate a task. 
Fault tolerance is a property that can be implemented in different ways. Redundancy (at different levels) is 
certainly the most popular way to achieve fault tolerance – however it is not the only way. For example, fault 
forecasting techniques (like memory scrubbing) inspect component sub-parts to find faults before they become 
failures; in case they detect a fault, they can repair (or reconfigure) the component sub-part and then avoid the 
failure. Fault repair is also a very common approach to achieve fault tolerance: in that sense, a CPU reset after a 
transient fault is a very straightforward way to achieve tolerance to transient faults. 
In DeSyRe, the basic concept is to “instrument” or “wrap” the unreliable components and sub-components by 
local fault supervisors (FS) to become self-aware of their faults and be able to dispatch this information to the fault-
free part. 
 
We discuss next some specific fault-detection and correction mechanisms used in the DeSyRe applications 
SoCs. 
A. Software Implemented Fault Tolerance 
Central Software implemented fault tolerance in DeSyRe will be performed using the application check-
pointing technique. The basic aim of this technique is to save the system state when no fault is detected or to roll 
back when one or more faults are detected. In this way, applications can overcome the impact of transient faults 
effectively. However, since this technique adds regular check-pointing or rollback intervals with the original 
execution times, performance overhead is caused. To incorporate a low-cost application check-pointing mechanism, 
 
Fault Type DeSyRe Detection mechanisms DeSyRe Correction mechanisms 
 
 
Permanent 
 
• Online testing 
• Self-checking components 
• Coarse- or fine-grain Reconfiguration (via Middleware, and runtime optimizations) 
• Task migration (possibly using alternative task descriptions) 
• Component sharing 
• Graceful degradation (through the above mechanisms, and with the assistance of 
runtime system optimizations) 
 
Transient 
• Software error detection codes ( used together 
with adaptive checkpoints) 
• Self-checking components 
• Adaptive check-pointing (i.e. rollback and recover). 
o Application-aware 
o Adapted to fault density 
• Self-correcting mechanisms at the components (i.e. ECCs) 
 
Intermittent 
• Same as transient, with some additional 
software mechanism to distinguish them from 
the transient faults 
• Task migration (possibly using alternative task descriptions) 
• System Reconfiguration and Runtime optimizations 
• Adaptive check-pointing (i.e. rollback and recover) 
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DeSyRe will dynamically adapt the check-pointing frequency depending on the application reliability requirements 
during runtime. Such check-pointing mechanism will be implemented in DeSyRe using inter-component 
communication as shown in Figure 4. Upon detection of one or more faults, the HW fault detection unit will 
communicate the approximate number and frequency of these faults to the Fault Analyzer unit within the software 
implemented fault tolerance manager . Using this information, the Fault Analyzer will then estimate and 
communicate the component reliability to the runtime system manager to adapt the check-pointing frequency 
accordingly.  
To date significant progress has been made towards implementing software based fault detection and tolerance 
in DeSyRe. The fault detection and tolerance are both carried out through a software modification technique, 
followed by its evaluation in terms of performance and memory footprint costs. Figure 9(a) shows the system 
architecture based on the Xentium DSP processor [7] enabling fault detection through software modification and 
correction through application check-pointing, while Figure 9 (b) shows the software modification based technique 
employed on this system architecture. As can be seen, to enable application check-pointing technique, Xentium 
incorporates a fault tolerant memory (sufficiently error correction coded) interfaced via the memory access (DMA) 
unit (Figure 9 (a)).  
With the given system architecture (Figure 9(a), fault detection and tolerance is carried out using Software 
Modification Aided transient eRror detection Technique (SMART) in three steps. In the first step, high-level source-
to-source conversion is carried out to replace the original data types to error detection enabler types. Such conversion 
essentially generates duplicate copies of the data and their computations to compare and detect the presence of 
transient faults. This is then followed by a low-level (i.e. assembly-level) software modification step to incorporate 
dynamic signature comparisons to detect transient faults in the software control flow during branch instructions. In 
this step, each branch label is preceded by inserting extra instructions to save the function of label address (sb) in a 
temporary register. Then, further instructions are also inserted after each label to save the function of current label 
address (sa) in another register. The previous and the new register values (i.e. sb and sa) are then compared to find any 
possible differences and thereby presence of one or more faults. Upon fault detection, rollback routines are initiated 
to avoid illegal control flow.  
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Figure 9:  (a) DeSyRe system architecture enabling check-pointing mechanism in Xentium DSP, (b) Software 
modification technique for transient fault detection and tolerance in Xentium DSP system 
 
To control the potential performance overhead due to duplication of data and their computations, SMART 
incorporates two different inputs generated by the application profiler (Figure 9 (b)): data usage profile and 
normalized usage threshold (UNT). The data usage profile gives the structured organization of the various variables 
and constants used in an application, together with their usage statistics. Using such data usage statistics, the tool 
only duplicates the original data types and operations of chosen variables or constants that have usage higher than 
normalized threshold (i.e. UN ≥ UNT). Normalized threshold usage (UNT) is calculated as a ratio of a variable's usage 
count to the maximum usage of any other variable. Details of how data/register usage is generated can be found in 
[26]. 
With the detected faults in first two steps (Figure 9 (b)), fault tolerance or correction is performed using 
software implemented application check-pointing technique enabled through further software modification as shown 
Submitted to MICPRO Special Issue on European projects on Digital System Design  
in Figure 9. The technique employs a handshake based routine between DMA and processor units to initiate the 
check-pointing mechanism (since hardware interrupt or timing based supervision is not featured in the DSP 
processor).  
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed fault detection and tolerance technique (Figure 9 (b)), a number of 
experiments are carried out in Xentium ISS environment [7] using different signal/image/data conditioning and 
processing benchmark applications to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed SMART tool with system 
architecture (Figure 9(a)). To demonstrate the effectiveness of the modified software description, initially full data 
duplication with UNT=0 is assumed. For each application, an approximate total of 5000 transient errors are injected in 
consecutive runs using single-event upset (SEU) based model (for fault injection details, see [27]). An arbitrary error 
probability of 10-12 (SEU per cycle) is assumed. Similar error injection has also been carried out in [16].  
Table 2 shows the impact of SEU injections on these benchmark applications. The average execution cycles per 
application for a given test input sequence is shown in column 2, while the percentage of injected SEUs in different 
instructions are shown in columns 3-6 (determined after application profiling through output trace followed by error 
injection). Columns 7-8 compare the percentage of incorrect executions without and with SMART technique. 
 
Table 2: Benchmark applications with injected SEUs in different instructions. 
 
Application   Avg. 
Cycles/run  
 % SEUs in 
STW / LDW  
% SEUs in 
Branch  
% SEUs in 
Arith / 
Logical  
% SEUs in 
Others  % Incorrect execution (w/o SMART)  
% Incorrect 
execution (w/ 
SMART) 
FIR   74953217   34.7   14.3   41.4   9.6   66   13 
DWT   98353826   33.4   16.4   42.1   8.1   61   14 
FFT   103505361   35.3   15.6   39.7   9.4   63   11 
WHT   97526718   39.3   13.6   37.5   9.6   60   15 
Viterbi   89962118   38.9   17.3   35.2   8.6   63   13 
JPEG   311822971   41.3   15.9   34.5   8.3   59   12 
 
From Table 2 two major observations can be made. Firstly, it can be seen that depending on the nature of 
applications the percentage SEUs injected in different instructions can vary. However, the injected SEUs show a 
general trend of higher SEUs being injected in load/store (i.e. LDW/STW) and arithmetic/logical instructions (which 
is expected as DSP applications are highly computationally intensive in nature). For example, for memory and 
computationally intensive JPEG application the highest number (41%) of SEUs are injected in the load/store memory 
instructions, while about 34% SEUs are injected in the arithmetic/logical instructions. The branch instructions are 
subjected to the next highest percentage of SEUs injected, which varies depending on the nature of application. With 
the given SEUs injected, the second observation is that proposed SMART technique can significantly reduce the 
number of incorrect executions (by up to 80% in the case of FIR application) through software implemented error 
detection and tolerance technique (Figure 9 (b)). This is because, proposed technique can effectively detect the SEUs 
injected and mitigate the impact of these SEUs through application check-pointing, enabled through software 
modification (in SMART-CP). However, note that up to 15% of the cases can still lead to incorrect executions (in the 
case of WHT application) using SMART technique. This underlines the limitations of the proposed software-only 
technique. 
 
 
Figure 10: SMART detection efficiency. 
 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of error detection through SMART technique, Figure 10 shows the effective 
percentage of masked (i.e. errors with no effect), detected (both by SMART-ED and SMART-SC) and undetected 
SEUs through SMART technique in the benchmark applications with UNT = 0 (i.e. full duplication of all data). From 
Figure 10, two observations can be made. First observation is that maximum number of injected SEUs (up to 74% for 
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WHT application) are detected through the proposed technique, while 17% SEUs can get masked, summing to an 
effective total of 91% errors being either detected or masked. Out of the detected SEUs, up to 85% are detected 
through the SMART-ED, while the rest of the SEUs are detected by SMART-SC. This is expected as SEUs injected 
in load/store and arithmetic/logical instruction dominate (Table 2). Note that up to 17% of the SEUs cannot be 
detected depending on where SEUs are injected. 
The inclusion of data duplication, dynamic signature generation and check-pointing through software modification 
imply performance overheads. This is because SMART-ED generates controlled repetitions of computations through 
normalized usage threshold, UNT, while SMART-SC requires signature generation and comparison cycles as well 
(Figure 9(b)). Furthermore, SMART-CP requires processor to software-implemented check-pointing, which incurs 
further overheads. 
  
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 11: (a) SMART performance overheads, and (b) SMART memory footprint overheads. 
 
To explore the performance overheads incurred due by SMART generated software modification, Figure 11(a) 
shows the normalized performance overheads of different benchmark applications with varied duplication control 
through normalized usage threshold (UNT). An approximate check-pointing interval of 106 cycles is chosen arbitrarily 
for the applications in comprehensive error injection environment. As can be seen SMART technique can result in a 
reasonable performance overhead for incorporating SEU detection and tolerance depending on the application and its 
nature of computation. For example, up to 83% performance overhead is incurred by Viterbi application (when all 
variables and data are duplicated, i.e. UNT=0). Note that although the proposed technique employs duplicate storage 
and computations, the performance overhead is contained. This is because the post modification compilation steps 
can employ instruction-level parallelism (a common feature in high-performance DSP processors) to reduce the 
performance overheads. Comparing the contributions of different SMART steps (Figure 9(b)), it can be seen that the 
highest performance overhead (about 65% for the WHT decoding application) is caused by SMART-ED. SMART-
CP is the second largest contributor for the performance overheads (with up to 13% overhead for the JPEG 
application). This can, however, vary depending on the approximate check-pointing interval assumed. SMART-SC 
contributes the lowest performance overheads for the given check-pointing interval when compared with the other 
steps. As expected, with higher normalized usage threshold, the duplication in the original application (through 
SMART-ED) can be controlled and the performance overheads show a trade-off. For example, when the duplication 
Submitted to MICPRO Special Issue on European projects on Digital System Design  
is only carried out for variables/constants that have more than 50% normalized usage (i.e. UN ≥ UNT = 0.5), the 
performance overhead reduced to as low as 56% for DWT application. Similar trend can also be observed from other 
applications. However, this reduction of duplication comes with a decrease in the detection coverage as well. For 
example, in the case of FIR application, the detection coverage (detected and masked) can reduce to 64% when 
UNT=0.5 (compared to 91% when UNT=0). 
Due to software modification, software descriptions can also expand with increased memory footprint. Figure 
11(b) shows the comparative memory footprints of different applications, showing contributions from different 
SMART steps. Since SMART-SC does not use memory resources, it is not shown. As expected, SMART-ED gives 
the highest memory overheads due to duplicated data components and related comparison instructions for detection 
of SEUs. Comparing the different applications, it can be seen that a reasonable 113% memory footprint overhead is 
caused by SMART technique in Viterbi and WHT applications, for example. This is because these applications use 
comparatively larger amount of data storage components (variables and data value holders) at high-level description, 
which is further duplicated by the proposed technique (SMART-ED). Further, it can also be seen that with controlled 
duplication through SMART-ED using normalized usage threshold, memory footprint can be reduced. This explains 
the trade-off between injected software redundancy overheads in terms of memory footprint and achievable error 
detection coverage, as expected. 
Software implemented fault tolerance (SW FT) achieved through the above technique, however, has limitations of 
not being able to tolerate all possible faults, including permanent faults. Hence, SW FT will use various fault 
syndromes, such as double rollback, double watchdog timeout events and acceptance tests, to generate permanent 
fault syndromes. Upon detection of such syndromes, the fault analyzer module (Figure 4) will request the runtime 
system manager to schedule appropriate online testing. More details of online testing can be found in Section IV-E. 
B. Transient Fault Tolerance for the SiMS RISC Processor  
Fault tolerance in the SiMS processor is facilitated through duplicating the instructions on-demand using a single-
event upset based fault model [20].Whenever a sequence of instructions is decided (on-demand) to be protected via 
instruction duplication, a dedicated register is set using a custom instruction. When decoded instructions are 
protected with the above mechanism, a hardware instruction-duplication unit duplicates this instruction in the next 
cycle. The result of the original instruction is stored in a dedicated register and, if the result of the “original” and the 
“duplicated” instruction are the same, the result is committed. If the results differ, then a fault is detected and the 
pipeline is flushed. The error is corrected by re-fetching the “original” instructions and resuming execution from the 
point of failure. An example is given in Figure 12, where all control-flow instructions are made fault tolerant and, 
therefore, instruction A is duplicated. 
 
 
Figure 12: Transient fault tolerance in RISC (SiMS) processor 
using instruction duplication and retry technique. 
 
Figure 13 : Soft-error manifestation in the SiMS core. 
 
 
The SiMS fault tolerance and its corresponding area, power, performance and energy overheads have been evaluated 
using a custom fault injector and a low-power encryption cipher, suitable for ultra-low-power systems, as 
benchmark. A number of duplication policies, duplicating none, control-flow instructions (jumps, branches), all 
control-flow related instructions (includes code-segments for e.g. loop-counter evaluation) or all instructions, has 
been devised to support various fault-tolerance requirements. In short, the previous list of policies offers increasingly 
higher fault tolerance. Figure 13 depicts the percentage of injected soft faults manifesting as (control-flow) soft-errors 
for each of the duplication policies. It is shown that, even when no fault tolerance is added, only a small percentage 
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(14.7%) manifests as a soft error, as the majority of faults are injected in idle parts of the processor. As expected, a 
duplication policy offering higher fault tolerance increases the number of corrected transient faults and, in case all 
instructions are duplicated, full fault tolerance to single-cycle transient faults is guaranteed.  
Besides, by injecting duplicated instructions in a consequent cycle after the original, the switching activity of the 
core is lowered (due to less bit toggles), thus minimizing the power-consumption overhead. Furthermore, by 
allowing duplicate instructions to be executed instead of scheduled nops, the increase in execution time is minimal. 
The technique comes at an overhead of area (+23%) and, when offering the highest degree of soft-fault tolerance, 
power consumption (+17.5 %), execution time (+42%) and energy consumption (+77%). 
C. Dual Core Lock-Step (DCLS) Architecture based Fault Detection 
One of the standard architectures used in the reliability and functional safety field is the Dual Core Lock-Step, 
i.e. two symmetrical processing units are contained on one die. The processing units run duplicate operations in 
lockstep (or delayed by a fixed period) and the results are compared. Any mismatch results in an error condition and 
usually a reset condition. However, for the objective of DeSyRe system (i.e. going beyond fault detection), the 
standard implementations of DCLS are not able to identify which one of the two CPUs is faulty; consequently, even 
if the fault is in the slave CPU (so it is not a real critical scenario) the system is typically put in safe state and the 
availability of the system is completely lost. On the contrary, the “smart” DCLS architecture proposed in DeSyRe is 
an advanced solution to detect and identify failures, which replaces the standard comparator used in the traditional 
scheme and is able to determine which of the two cores is the faulty one, exploiting micro-architectural information 
extracted from the cores. As illustrated in 14, this new Advanced Comparator is an IP sitting in between the two 
processors (master and slave) taking control of the bus. It embeds cycle-by-cycle comparators, assuring the same 
basic functionality described for the standard DCLS, and it removes DCLS limitations adding features basically 
aimed to: 
 
• detect which of the two cores is failing, if possible preserving the availability of the system (Identification 
Coverage); 
• provide failure information to allow failure control techniques; 
• swap the CPU master with the CPU slave when the default master is damaged. 
 
Adavanced
Comparator
 
Figure 14: The advanced comparator in the DCLS 
scheme. 
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  Figure 15: The operation steps of “smart” DCLS (and 
related timing). 
 
The “smart” DCLS has been implemented for ARM Cortex-R4 and Cortex-R5 CPUs but it can support all different 
types of CPU including the Xentium. The implementation addresses not only the inner portion of the CPU core but 
also outer structures like caches.   
Efficiency in the detection, identification and repair of faults has been measured by means of a fault injection 
campaign on both permanent and transient faults. Faults coverage results of the “smart” DCLS architecture are 
summarized in the following table. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Coverage results of the “smart” DCLS. 
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Coverage Value Note 
Diagnostic coverage 99,9% Coverage is guaranteed also for faults that could affect 
the small portion of “smart” DCLS that could directly 
affect the mission function (e.g. the CPU switch). 
Dependent failures detection βIC=23% Achieved thanks to the Common-Cause Failure 
detector (see paragraph E). βIC is an semi-quantitative 
method introduced by IEC 61508 standard to measure 
dependent failures coverage. 
Identification coverage  by HW  60%  
Identification coverage  by HW + SW  90% Achieved by running a SW Test Library  
Latent faults coverage 90% Latent faults coverage of  “smart” DCLS  stand-alone 
 
Another important characteristic of the “smart” DCLS is the ability to quickly detect, isolate and identify the 
fault that may affect one of the two CPU cores, so guaranteeing the faster reaction and reconfiguration. In general, as 
shown in the next figure, each of the operation steps of “smart” DCLS can be associated to a time interval: 
• DTI = Detection Time Interval 
• ISTI = Isolation Time Interval 
• IDTI = Identification Time Interval 
• RTI = Restoration Time Interval 
 
Performance results achieved by “smart” DCLS are shown in the next table. 
 
Table 4: Performance results of the “smart” DCLS. 
Step Value Note 
DTI ~ 3 clock cycles The fault is detected as soon as it appears at 
CPU output 
ISTI ~ 20 clock cycles  
IDTI ~ 300 µs @ 160 MHz Average IDTI when fault is identified by 
“smart” DCLS HW 
~ 2 ms@ 160 MHz Average IDTI when fault is identified by 
“smart” DCLS SW 
RTI ~ 150 clock cycles This is the case in which a reset is not needed. 
Depends on the overall 
circuit architecture 
This is the case in which a reset is needed. The 
reset time depends on the specific MCU. 
 
The total overhead in terms of gate counts of “smart” DCLS (including also 4 instances of the “CCF detector” 
described in paragraph E) is in the range of 150-200 Kgates depending on the specific CPU. 
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Figure 16: Communication between HW fault detection wrapper of a component and the Supervisor at the fault-free part 
of the DeSyRe system. 
D. Component Wrapper 
Typically, in a safety-critical system, the alarm information shall be communicated to the System Supervisor 
(the fault-free part of the DeSyRe system) using a dedicated Hardware fault detection wrapper and a communication 
channel implemented using separate safe interconnections and transporting diagnostic information. This way the 
diagnostic and mission channels are kept separate, resulting in a more safe and robust system according to norm 
recommendations. This dedicated bus connects all the detectors implied in system. Moreover, having a dedicated 
communication channel to convey diagnostic information results in a faster transfer of critical alarms toward the 
system supervisor. 
 
The HW fault detection wrapper provides to the fault-free part the following information: 
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• Alarm_Error. These alarms are related to the dangerous faults  
• Alarm_Warning. These alarms are related to event near dangerous fault (e.g. Common Cause Failure 
detector provides warning signals which indicate that the silicon behavior got closer to violating 
constraints) 
• Alarm_Info. These signals provide information about the coherency of the results in order to identify 
problems inside the detector. 
E. Common Cause Failure (CCF) Detection 
Detection of dependent failures and especially common-cause failures is crucial to allow identification and proper 
repair. In fact, common-cause failures are one of the most important failure modes when diagnostic mechanisms are 
implemented in the same silicon device. There are different types of common cause failures, like temperature 
variation and noise into power supply and the clock. It is well known that high temperature operation compromises 
long-term reliability and impacts circuit performance such as the timing characteristics of the circuit, causing timing 
violations. Similar timing effects can be obtained in case of noise affecting power supply and clock network. In order 
to avoid the standard measures to detect common-cause failure, the solution studied and implemented in DeSyRe 
consists in a CCF detector which can be instantiated according to the position of the expected redundancies. The 
CCF detector is a completely independent checker. It includes special structures used to understand when the circuit 
approaches timing-violating operating conditions. In order to make the CCF detector sensible to CCF problems, 
some internal paths are configurable during synthesis (e.g. by means of delay chain) to achieve the same critical path 
than the critical path in the IP under detection. The internal paths are redundant to distinguish real CCF problems 
from problems of the CCF detector itself. The CCF can be used in conjunction with Dual Core Lock-Step 
architectures (DCLS) explained in the previous section. 
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Figure 17: The novel DeSyRe flexible/reconfigurable hardware substrate. 
V. DESYRE RECONFIGURABLE SUBSTRATE 
The DeSyRe framework relies significantly on a flexible and dynamically reconfigurable hardware substrate to 
isolate, replace and (when possible) correct design and manufacturing defects as well as other permanent faults due 
to aging. In previous works, the design choice was either coarse- or fine-grain granularity of substitutable units; these 
are units that can be replaced when defective. In the first case, the substitutable unit can be an entire sub-component 
(e.g. a microprocessor’s pipeline stage), while in the latter case an FPGA logic cell. There are tradeoffs between 
these two alternatives. Coarse-grain approaches are less defect-tolerant - fewer defects can have large impact to the 
system - but lead to solutions that are more power and silicon efficient. Fine-grain approaches can tolerate a larger 
number of defects, but utilizing an FPGA-like substrate introduces performance, power, and cost overheads. 
 
One of the primary challenges in the DeSyRe project is to investigate the architecture of the underlying 
hardware substrate for the DeSyRe SoC. DeSyRe explores a granularity mix of fine- and coarse-grain underlying 
hardware in order to provide increased defect-tolerance without giving away significant parts of the system 
performance and power efficiency. Figure 17 depicts such an example with two DeSyRe RISC components. In this 
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example, each RISC processor is divided in smaller sub-components (implemented in fixed hardware), i.e. pipeline 
stages, functional units, etc., surrounded by reconfigurable interconnects/wires. In the absence of defects, the sub-
components ‘S’ will form the RISC component. However, in case a sub-component is defective, it can be isolated 
using the reconfigurable interconnects, and subsequently be replaced either by an identical unused neighboring sub-
component (S), or by a functionally equivalent instance (S’) implemented in fine-grain reconfigurable hardware. 
A. Benefits and Overheads of Reconfigurability 
In order to have a better understanding of aforementioned tradeoffs, an analytical study has been performed for 
an array of processors such as the ones depicted in Figure 17. In the presence of permanent faults, we evaluated 5 
different cases of processor arrays with fine-grain and/or coarse-grain reconfigurablity compared to no 
reconfigurability at all.  In this study, it is assumed that a fixed silicon area is available which can accommodate a 
certain number of cores; as expected different choice or reconfigurability has different area overheads and therefore 
different number of cores fit in the given area. The 5 cases of multicore arrays are as follows:  
 
1. A baseline multiprocessor array design with no reconfiguration which fits 9 cores.  
2. Coarse-grain reconfigurable array providing stage-level reconfigurability, which fits 6 cores.  
3. Fine- and Coarse-Grain design, similar to the one depicted in Figure 17, which fits 4 cores and a fine-grain 
substrate that can be used to configure 4 pipeline stages.  
4. Restricted coarse-grain reconfigurable array which provides cores with interchangeable stages within two 
clusters of 4 and 3 cores, respectively. This constraint reduces the area overhead fitting 7 cores in the given 
area. 
5. Similar to the previous creating clusters of pairs of cores, allows fitting 8 cores in the given area, although 
restricting the options of reconfiguration.  
 
Considering a defect rate that varies between 10 to 90% probability to have a defect in a pipeline stage, we 
measured the probability of each one of the above cases to provide at least 3 working cores. Figure 18 shows the 
result of this evaluation. For low defect rates the probability of delivering 3  working cores is almost 1 for all cases. 
However, as the defect rate increases, and above 40% chance to have a defect in a pipeline stage, the reconfigurable 
cases are more defect tolerant than the baseline. More specifically, the simple coarse-grain reconfigurability may 
offer up to 10 times better probability than the baseline, the clustered coarse-grain approach is the best guaranteeing 
at least 80% probability to have 3 working cores even in very high defect rates. Finally, the mix of fine and coarse 
grain reconfigurable substrate is somewhere in between the other reconfiguration options mainly due to its excessive 
area overhead which allows to fit only 4 cores in the given area. 
 
 For our experiments, we considered as a case study processor the SiMS RISC of the DeSyRe SoCs. For this 
example, the 40% defect rate corresponds roughly to 4 defects per million transistors. Modeling aging effects in 
32nm technology it is estimated that up to 2-6 transistors per million can be damaged in 5 years SoC lifetime only 
due to the NBTI (Negative Bias Temperature Instability). In this modeling, temperatures 90-130 degrees Celsius 
were considered, and a 25% to 95% duty cycle, while a transistor is considered damaged when having less than 40% 
of its initial voltage threshold. In general, we can state that the area overhead of the considered reconfigurability 
varies between 10% to 2x, while the performance overheads are between 15-50% in the coarse grain case and about 
5 x in the fine-grain case. 
 
B. Dynamic Reconfiguration. 
In order to utilize the reconfiguration capabilities mentioned above, the Middleware performs dynamic 
reconfiguration based on the decisions made by the System Optimizations module of the Runtime System. More 
specifically, the System Optimizations module decides the appropriate configuration of each component based on 
various objectives and system constraints (i.e. real-time constraints, power consumption requirements) and sends a 
request to the Reconfiguration Management module to configure a component of the system. 
An example of coarse grain reconfiguration between two identical components is given below, referring to 
Figure 13. Both components have faulty stages in the coarse grain part and cannot be utilized under the existing 
configuration. The System Optimizations module sends a request to the Middleware to configure both components 
by bypassing faulty parts in order to recover a component that ensembles correct functionality.  In general, the steps 
for the hardware reconfiguration process are:  
1. The System Optimizations module decides the appropriate configuration of the components, given the 
existing faults and system constraints.  
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2. The System Optimizations module requests from the Reconfiguration Management to perform 
configuration of the two components and transmits a high level description of the required component 
configuration.  
3. The Reconfiguration Management module processes the above request, notifies the wrapper of the target 
components about the scheduled reconfiguration, and provides the required information (i.e. configuration 
stream) to the wrapper (and specifically to the Component Reconfiguration module – see Figure 4). 
4. The Component Reconfiguration modules of the target components are then responsible for: 
• Loading the new configuration stream into the components. 
• Checking the status of the new configuration. 
5. The wrapper passes the status of the reconfiguration to the Reconfiguration Management module and the 
Reconfiguration Management module passes on the message about successful or not reconfiguration to the 
System Optimizations module. 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Effect of introducing Coarse/fine grain reconfigurability:  Performance comparison for 5 different scenarios of 
a Multiprocessor array. 
VI. BASELINE IMPLEMENTATION PLATFORM 
The DeSyRe applications are implemented on a heterogeneous multi-core SoC template depicted in Figure 19. 
The DeSyRe baseline SoCs consist of multiple heterogeneous processing cores, such as Xentium DSP cores [7], on-
chip memory blocks, RISC processors, and custom accelerator blocks interconnected by a Network-on-Chip (NoC). 
Fault-tolerance extensions to existing NoC approaches [8][9] as implemented in [10] and [11], respectively, are 
considered in DeSyRe. The heterogeneous baseline SoC is implemented in the fault-prone part of the DeSyRe 
system. Moreover, part of the DeSyRe system is realized on a separate general-purpose processor, which is 
considered to be the fault-free part of the system 
In the next Section, two (medical) applications are described that are implemented based on the DeSyRe SoC 
framework: The artificial-cerebellum SoC consists of a RISC processor, a Custom-IP and multiple Xentium 
processors to perform the computationally intensive tasks of modeling brain-cells. The artificial pancreas will be 
more lightweight; it includes a RISC processor for control, a Custom-IP for calculating the insulin rates and a 
Xentium processor for encryption and data-logging.  
In the remainder of this section we describe in more detail each component of the baseline implementation 
platform. 
A. Reconfigurable fault-tolerant NoC 
The main communication infrastructure in the DeSyRe SoC is provided by a NoC. All Xentium processing 
tiles, processor, memory resources and other accelerator cores are accessible via the NoC. Moreover, the NoC can be 
used to (re)configure cores in the SoC, and to access scan chains (at run-time for on-line testing) and memory Built-
In Self-Test units of e.g. the Xentium tiles. 
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A key feature of NoCs is their predictable performance. Besides, well-designed NoCs allow disabling inactive parts 
of the network, which is essential for energy-efficiency and dependability. With respect to creating a reliable and 
fault-tolerant SoC architecture, the NoC is a crucial building block. Different levels of reliability can be identified in 
the SoC, which require large involvement of the NoC: 
• On the SoC level, processor tile errors and memory tile errors can occur. Upon errors in the SoC, defective 
processor cores or memories in the SoC will be disabled and another (reconfigurable) processor core or 
memory part will be used to (re)execute a task; reconfiguring processor cores in the multi-core SoC or using 
different dedicated memory parts requires that data channels in the NoC are re-routed. 
• On the NoC level, connection errors, channel errors, router errors or link errors can occur which are due to 
errors induced in the NoC elements. 
On the system-level, the most important requirement of the NoC is that data can be re-routed in the multi-core SoC. 
Hence, the routing mechanisms should be based on dynamic routing schemes in the NoC routers. Upon detection of 
e.g. core errors, the system should be capable of re-routing channels from a source tile to a different destination tile 
in the multi-core SoC. Also, on the system-level, the individual building blocks of the SoC should provide means to 
detect that e.g. an error occurred in a processing tile of the multi-core SoC. After detection of an error on system-
level, run-time software should take immediate action in order to reconfigure the multi-core SoC.   
 
 
Figure 19: DeSyRe SoC template with two Xentium DSPs, 
memories and custom (DeSyRe) IP blocks. 
 
 
Figure 20: Xentium DSP tile with NoC interface. 
 
 
B. Xentium DSP 
The Xentium core is a 32-bit fixed-point DSP core designed for high-performance embedded signal processing. The 
VLIW architecture of the Xentium features 10 parallel execution slots and includes support for Single Instruction 
Multiple Data (SIMD) and zero-overhead loops. High-performance and energy-efficiency are achieved by 
optimizing parallel operation at instruction level. The core modules of the Xentium tile are the Xentium core, the 
tightly coupled data memory and a NoC interface as shown in the block diagram in Figure 20. A default instance of 
the Xentium DSP tile contains 16-kB tightly coupled data memory and 8 kB instruction cache. The size of the data 
and instruction memories is configurable at design-time of the multi-core SoC. 
C. SiMS Processor  
The SiMS core is a MIPS-like, 5-stage (Fetch, Decode, Execute, Memory, Writeback) processor, optimized for 
low-power operation. Low-power consumption is currently achieved by a minimalistic design (e.g. by omitting 
advanced architectural features such as branch predictor of forwarding unit) but ongoing efforts focus on 
architecture- and compiler-based enhancements. The processor has 16 32-bit registers, a 16kB Instruction Memory 
(16-bit ISA, 24 instructions) and a 16kB Data Memory (32-bit data words). The SiMS core is integrated as one of the 
DeSyRe IP modules in the DeSyRe SoC, depicted in Figure 19. 
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D. Custom-IP blocks  
The Custom-IP blocks for the two applications each consist of one main computing unit and several smaller 
hardware blocks, used for data-buffering and communication to and from the NoC. The computing hardware blocks 
are implemented with floating-point components from the FPLibrary [21], and are optimized for area. The custom-IP 
blocks are integrated in the DeSyRe SoC template in the DeSyRe IP place-holders. 
The artificial-cerebellum compute block is a custom hardware implementation of the “soma” task (see Section 
VIII.) It is a dataflow circuit with complex floating-point arithmetic operations such as exponent, divisions and 
multiplications. Its latency is 127 clock cycles. 
The artificial-pancreas compute block is a custom hardware implementation of the insulin rate task (see Section 
VIII.) It is a state-machine controller with floating-point multiplications and additions. Depending on the input 
values its latency varies with a maximum of 42 clock cycles. 
E. Memory tiles 
The multi-core SoC is equipped with (on-chip) memory tiles, connected to the NoC. In Figure 19 an SRAM 
memory tile as well as an SDRAM controller are integrated in the SoC template. Depending on the implemented 
application, the system designer could integrate on-chip or off-chip memory resources. It is key for scalable multi-
core systems-on-chip to have sufficient distributed memory available in the SoC in order to avoid bottlenecks 
through single shared resources. In DeSyRe, the distributed memory in the SoC will adapt multiple functions, such 
as storage of DSP execution binary, elastic buffers, storage of checkpoints, storage of (intermediate) processing 
results, etc. 
All communication in the DeSyRe SoC is memory-mapped over the NoC. In the course of the DeSyRe project, 
existing NoC approaches [8][9] will be considered and used to build a fault-tolerant NoC that satisfies the given 
requirements on tolerating SoC-level and NoC-level errors. Moreover, the DSP cores and memory tiles in the SoC 
will be extended with local checkers and (on-line) test wrappers to monitor the healthiness of the cores in the SoC at 
run-time. The ultimate goal is to have a reliable NoC that can be used for application data communication as well as 
for transferring (on-line) test information, such as test patterns, from test pattern generators to the test circuitry of a 
core, or to transfer (on-line) test results from the component-under-test (CuT) to a response analyzer. The test 
wrappers will be developed according to the IEEE1500 standard and are accessible by the NoC. 
VII. APPLICATIONS  
The DeSyRe framework will be applied to two medical SoCs, namely an artificial cerebellum and an artificial 
pancreas. Both applications are being developed by Neurasmus BV, one of the DeSyRe-project industrial partners. 
Currently, preliminary prototypes of the two applications have been implemented and validated on an FPGA board. 
In the second phase of the project, these two systems will be enhanced with the fault-tolerance features being 
developed under the DeSyRe project. 
Although both DeSyRe medical applications exhibit high reliability requirements, the artificial-pancreas system 
is radically different from the artificial cerebellum, a difference which will help to demonstrate the diversity and 
flexibility of the DeSyRe framework. The artificial cerebellum system requires significant processing of complex 
mathematical operations in many concurrent tasks. On the contrary, the artificial pancreas requires – by comparison 
– few computations for processing and controlling sensors and actuators, and for interfacing (security, 
communication, compression) to a treating physician or the patient. It requires, however, more rigorous closed-loop 
control, and should be ultra-low-power and adaptive to new treatment descriptions. 
A. Artificial Cerebellum 
Neurasmus is developing an artificial, real-time, cerebellar medical MPSoC for rescuing damaged parts of an 
actual, biological brain suffering from various brain diseases stemming from loss of sensorimotor control, such as 
calcium-channelopathies, fragile-x and autism. The mid-term goal of Neurasmus is the development of a portable, 
artificial-cerebellum unit which can be carried to a home environment for patient use or to a lab environment for 
clinical experiments with the purpose of rescuing (i.e. replacing) parts of a failed or failing biological brain. 
An artificial cerebellum effectively is a closed-loop-control system which will entail massive processing tasks 
as well as real-time interfacing to multiple recorded (input) and stimulated (output) neural structures. In its first 
generation, it is expected to be portable and has the following requirements:  
• high reliability due to its medical application; 
• high throughput (for replacing a large number of biological neurons); 
• low latency (for “real-brain-time” processing); 
• power efficiency for portability; and 
• adaptability to different input patterns. 
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1) The Inferior-Olive model 
Within the DeSyRe project, Neurasmus has developed a prototype system that can accurately simulate one of 
the main structures of the olivocerebellar loop in the brain, i.e. the inferior olive. Neurons in the inferior olive are 
tightly coupled and produce synchronous and constant oscillations as well as controlled spikes that are believed to be 
essential for the fine-tuned motor-control ability of the cerebellar cortex. The inferior-olive model we have 
implemented has been originally developed by Jornt de Gruijl [23], one of our collaborators at the Netherlands 
Institute for Neuroscience. The model is an extension of the earlier model published by Schweihofer et.al. [24] and is 
based on Hodgkin-Huxley differential equations [25]. These equations describe in detail the electrical activity that 
results from the combination of external changes in the electrical potential and the internal concentrations of the 
main chemical components involved in the transmission of neural-signals: calcium, potassium and sodium. The 
model divides the neuron into three anatomical compartments: dendrites, soma and axon. The soma is the cell body 
and the dendrites are extensions of the soma that receive the electro-chemical signals coming from other neurons. 
The axon is the neuron tail that transmits the electrical signals to other neurons. For every compartment, a few 
chemical channels are present in the model so as to contribute to the total compartment potential, as shown on Figure 
21. Furthermore, the computational model operates in a pipeline fashion to allow for the concurrent execution of the 
three compartments. In order to support real-time operation, all cells are required to compute one iteration of 
compartmental calculations within 50µs. 
 
2) The IO-network model 
Figure 22 illustrates (a) the network-model architecture and (b) its MPSoC implementation. Every cell receives, 
through the dendritic compartment, the influence of its eight neighboring cells (thus modeling the biological gap-
junctions). The dendrites in every cell also receive an externally evoked current Iapp. Conversely, the axon voltage 
Va of all cells is the system output. The system works in lock-step computing discrete output values that, when 
aggregated in time, contribute to form the electrical waveform response of the system. The IO-Network controller 
module ensures the correct synchronization of the cell computations when multiple cells and compartments are being 
executed simultaneously.  
 
3) Application’s mapping and implementation onto the MPSoC 
The inferior-olive-model source code, initially available in Matlab, has been rewritten in C and then 
parallelized and ported to the DeSyRe baseline platform presented in Section I. Figure 22 shows the mapping of the 
application components onto the hardware cores. The controller block runs on the SiMS processor and is in charge of 
initializing the necessary data structures (especially the cell states) and, then, it runs the loop that guarantees the 
synchronization among the concurrent tasks. We define as task the execution of one instance of one of the cell 
compartments and, therefore, have three types of tasks: dendrite, soma and axon. Based on initial profiling results 
(See Table 5), we have identified the soma task as the most computationally intensive one. Therefore, the dendrite 
and axon tasks are mapped to Xentium processors, while the soma has been implemented in hardware as a custom IP 
block, as described in the previous section. 
 
Figure 21 : Block diagram of the three-compartment model of a single inferior-olive neuron cell.  
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Figure 22: Block diagram of (a) the IO-Network model and its mapping (b) onto the MPSoC architecture. 
 
Table 5: Profiling of the three IO-cell compartments on the Xentium simulator. 
 Dendrite Soma Axon 
Execution cycles 35860 64421 33008 
% of execution time 27% 48% 25% 
(1) Task I/O data (bytes) 128/24 128/36 128/16 
 
A shared-memory tile holds a large data structure that contains the state of all the cells in the network. The state 
of each cell is a collection of variables that represent, at every moment in time, the compartment’s electrical 
potentials and the concentrations of the chemical elements modeled. In every time step, the controller issues three 
tasks per cell times the total number of modeled cells. Within DeSyRe, pre-recorded real neural-signal traces will be 
used as inputs for the evaluation of the proposed system.  
The current prototype also includes an AHB subsystem with a Leon2 processor and a few peripherals for 
interfacing with a host PC. In the second stage of the project, the AHB subsystem can be used for implementing the 
fault-free part of the DeSyRe system. Furthermore, the dashed components in Figure 22 (a) indicate how the system is 
scaled by adding pairs of Xentiums and memory tiles if required. The abundant parallelism in the application, 
combined with the use of a NoC, allow the application performance to scale along. While the Custom-IP is designed 
to cope with the added performance pressure of tens of Xentium cores, the SiMS core is expected to saturate first. 
One solution we envision is the use of a clustered architecture with several SiMS cores. This architectural style is 
particularly interesting also from the biological point of view, since it matches the clustering of neurons that 
naturally happens in the brain. 
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Figure 23: Block diagram of (a) the artificial-pancreas application and (b) its mapping onto the MPSoC architecture. 
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B. Artificial pancreas  
In some forms of diabetes, the pancreas cannot produce insulin sufficiently. The sheer number and increasing 
rates of such patients worldwide is a major incentive for developing a so-called "artificial pancreas" device. In 
essence, such a device is a closed-loop-control implant which samples the glucose levels in the blood stream and 
releases insulin as needed (see Figure 23). Even though an actual, chronic artificial pancreas has not been developed 
yet, glucose-sensing implants have constantly increased in numbers and improved over the years [4][5]. 
Given the constantly increasing number of diabetic patients, Neurasmus envisions implementing the artificial 
pancreas implant as a DeSyRe-based, implantable system for automatically and accurately regulating blood glucose 
levels. In a fashion similar to the artificial-cerebellum application, this system is also subject to tight requirements of: 
 
• high reliability due to its medical application; 
• security (to avoid intruders); 
• power efficiency for portability; and 
• adaptability to different input patterns. 
 
1) Application’s description 
As shown in Figure 23(a), the current system contains a module for processing sensory data and calculating the 
insulin dose, and a module for data logging that includes compression, encryption and checksuming. In developing 
this application, we adopt the latest achievements in artificial-pancreas research [22][13][14], while improving on the 
state of the art by providing highly defect-tolerant devices, suitable for chronic implantation. The encrypted data 
logging feature is a further innovation in our system. 
2) Application’s mapping 
Figure 23(b) illustrates the mapping of the artificial-pancreas application onto the MPSoC platform. The user 
interface and the system control runs on the SiMS processor. The control algorithm that decides on the insulin dose 
based on the glucose readings is implemented in custom hardware. Finally, the data-logging block is serviced by a 
Xentium processor. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
The increasing need for fault tolerance imposed by the currently observed technology scaling introduces 
significant performance and power overheads. In our attempt to alleviate these overheads, the DeSyRe project will 
deliver a new generation of – by design – reliable systems, at a reduced power and performance cost. This is 
achieved through the following main contributions. Rather than aiming at totally fault-free chips, DeSyRe designs 
fault-tolerant systems built using unreliable components. In addition, DeSyRe systems are on-demand adaptive to 
various types and densities of faults, as well as to other system constraints and application requirements. A new 
dynamically reconfigurable substrate is designed and combined with runtime system software support in order to 
leverage on-demand adaptation, customization, and reliability at reduced cost. The above will result in a well-
defined, generic and repeatable design framework for a large variety of SoCs. The proposed framework is applied to 
two medical SoCs with high reliability constraints and diverse performance and power requirements. 
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